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Deconcentrating Public Housing in Minneapolis: *Hollman v. Cisneros*

by Edward G. Goetz

In July 1992, attorneys for the Minnesota Legal Aid Society and the Minneapolis branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) filed a lawsuit in federal district court on behalf of a group of plaintiffs living in public housing in Minneapolis. The complaint in *Hollman v. Cisneros*, which was named for lead plaintiff Lucy Hollman, alleged that the operation and placement of public housing in Minneapolis perpetuated racial and low-income segregation. The co-defendants in the *Hollman* suit—the Minneapolis Public Housing Authority (MPHA), the City of Minneapolis, the Minneapolis Community Development Agency, the Metropolitan Council of the Twin Cities, and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)—offered to enter into settlement discussions with the plaintiffs, and after three years of negotiations, an agreement was reached.

The *Hollman* consent decree, signed in 1995, committed the co-defendants in the lawsuit to a series of policy changes to deconcentrate family public housing in the city of Minneapolis and to disperse subsidized households throughout the Twin Cities metropolitan area. Specifically, the consent decree required the following steps: (1) redevelopment of a 73-acre site on Minneapolis' north side that held more than 700 units of family public housing, (2) relocation of all families living in the public housing demolished as a result of the redevelopment, (3) development of replacement housing throughout the metropolitan

area for all of the public housing units lost in the north side redevelopment, (4) provision of special mobility subsidies to allow eligible low-income families to move to neighborhoods of

low-poverty or low-minority concentration, (5) changes to elements of the Minneapolis Section 8 housing program to enhance the geographic choices available to program participants, and



Photo by Edward G. Goetz

In This Issue:

- Deconcentrating Public Housing in Minneapolis: *Hollman v. Cisneros*1
- HACER Receives Community Collaborator of the Year Award8
- Minnesota's Unreformed Sales Tax9
- Reading Achievement in an Urban School: Collaboration for Reform15
- Project Funding Available from CURA22
- Project Awards22
- New Publication24

(6) creation of a centralized information clearinghouse for low-cost housing opportunities throughout the metro region.

In 1999, the Family Housing Fund, a nonprofit agency dedicated to providing affordable housing, and the Minnesota Housing Finance Agency contracted with CURA to conduct an evaluation of the implementation of the *Hollman* consent decree. The MPHA provided open access to data and information, allowing a complete analysis of the impacts of the consent decree. The findings of the three-year evaluation were released by CURA earlier this year in an eight-volume report (see sidebar).

This article summarizes the outcomes of the *Hollman* Special Mobility Program and the relocation and replacement housing efforts. Part one describes where families have moved and where replacement housing has been built, and compares these neighborhoods to conditions that characterized the north side public housing site. Part two summarizes the findings from more than six hundred in-person interviews conducted with families who participated in the various elements of the *Hollman* settlement and two comparison groups.

The National Public Housing Context

The *Hollman* consent decree was signed at a time when national policy and local efforts in Minneapolis were aimed at dispersing low-income households as a means of reducing the social pathologies resulting from a high degree of spatially concentrated poverty. The secretary of HUD during President Clinton's first administration named concentrated poverty the most challenging domestic policy question facing the nation. Several studies had demonstrated HUD's own role in contributing to concentrated poverty by spatially concentrating low-income public housing, a fact that HUD increasingly acknowledged. As a result, the two largest federal initiatives in housing at the time were the HOPE VI program, an initiative to redevelop and deconcentrate public housing, and the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) mobility program, aimed at providing the means for subsidized households to move to low-poverty areas. In Minneapolis, rising crime and growing awareness of pockets of poverty and the disparity between

Cover photo: The redevelopment plan for the north side site created as a result of the *Hollman* consent decree called for the demolition of all 770 units of public housing on the site.

city and suburban areas led to a policy environment in which officials were receptive to efforts to break up poor communities and facilitate the movement of low-income families into more middle-class neighborhoods.

The concept of deconcentrating public housing families was central to the *Hollman* consent decree. The decree defined *poverty-concentrated neighborhoods* as census tracts in the central cities in which more than 33.5% of the population is below the poverty level, or census tracts in the suburbs in which 12.2% or more of the population is below the poverty level. *Minority-concentrated neighborhoods* were defined as any census tract in the region in which 28.7% or more of the population is non-White.

Shortly after the consent decree was signed, focus groups were formed to determine the nature of the redevelopment of the north side public housing site. Public housing residents, neighbors, local social service agents, and other stakeholders were involved in the focus group process. After nine months, the focus groups made their recommendations to MPHA, which then created a redevelopment plan. The Minneapolis City Council signed off on the plan in 1997. The plan called for the demolition of all 770 units of family public housing on the site. In their place would be a mix of housing ranging from market-rate single-family homes to subsidized public housing. The site would also have a mix of uses that would include parkland.

Methods

Families who were relocated from the demolished public housing or voluntarily participated in the special mobility program were provided with mobility counseling by agencies under contract with MPHA. Information on the moving preferences and relocation outcomes of these families was obtained from the files kept by the counseling agencies. The analysis of the replacement housing was based on interviews with public officials involved in the development of the units. Addresses for all replacement units, as well as addresses for the old and new homes of families relocated or part of the special mobility program, were geocoded. Neighborhood characteristics for original and replacement neighborhoods were taken from 1990 U.S. Census data.

Demolition and Relocation

Relocation of families from the north side public housing site began in 1996.

The *Hollman* Reports Now Available from CURA

The complete findings of CURA's three-year evaluation of the *Hollman v. Cisneros* settlement are now available in a series of eight reports written by Edward G. Goetz. The reports conclude that the consent decree has produced mixed results in the construction of replacement housing units, the reduction of race and poverty concentration in the Twin Cities, and the use of special mobility certificates.

All eight *Hollman* reports are available in a single bound volume or as individual reports. The reports can be found online as PDF files (requires Adobe Acrobat Reader 4.0 or later to download or print) at <http://www.cura.umn.edu/publications/Hollman.html>. Hardcopies of the reports can be ordered from CURA by calling 612-625-1551 or sending e-mail to cura@tc.umn.edu. Please limit requests to **one copy** of each report.

Deconcentrating Poverty in Minneapolis: Hollman v. Cisneros. Reports 1-8.
By Edward G. Goetz. Minneapolis: CURA, 2002. CURA 02-3. 326 pp. Free. (compilation of *Reports 1-8* below)

Report No. 1: Policy Context and Previous Research on Housing Dispersal. CURA 01-5. 92 pp. Free.

Report No. 2: Planning for North Side Redevelopment. CURA 01-6. 46 pp. Free.

Report No. 3: Baseline Data Analysis for North Side Redevelopment. CURA 01-7. 33 pp. Free.

Report No. 4: Changes to the Public Housing Stock in Minneapolis. CURA 01-8. 17 pp. Free.

Report No. 5: Relocation of Residents from North Side Public Housing. CURA 01-9. 33 pp. Free.

Report No. 6: The Experiences of Dispersed Families. CURA 01-10. 35 pp. Free.

Report No. 7: Mobility Certificates. CURA 01-11. 29 pp. Free.


Report No. 8: Replacement Housing. CURA 01-12. 41 pp. Free.

Demolition of the Sumner Field and Olson Townhomes projects began in that year as well. In 1998, relocation from the Glenwood and Lyndale projects began, with demolition of the projects following in 1999 and 2000. In all, 440 households were relocated. This number is significantly less than the 770 units torn down because some families moved out prior to the beginning of relocation assistance, and other families were ineligible for relocation assistance for various reasons. More than half of the relocated families (57%) were Southeast Asian and 39% were African American. One-third of the families were large, having five or more people.

Most of the relocated families (70%) indicated that they wanted to remain in one of the central cities (overwhelmingly Minneapolis). One-third preferred to stay in public housing of some type, whereas 39% preferred to receive a Section 8 housing subsidy that they could use in a privately owned apartment unit. During the first wave of relocation (1996 to 1997) most families were relocated using Section 8 subsidies. After the housing market in the region tightened in 1997 and remained so through 2001, Section 8 vouchers became more difficult to use and most of the relocated families were moved into other public housing. In the end, 41% of the families were moved into

public housing, 36% were moved into Section 8 housing, and 16% became homeowners. Most of the families (87%), regardless of the type of housing they inhabited, remained in the central cities. Southeast Asian families were most likely to remain in the city and to remain somewhere on the north side of Minneapolis. A total of 10% of the north side families moved to inner-ring suburbs in the region (typically the northern-ring suburbs of Minneapolis), whereas a handful of families moved beyond the inner ring or out of the region altogether. Figure 1 shows the clustering of relocated families in the northern and southern neighborhoods of Minneapolis.

Figure 1. Recent Address of Relocation within the Twin Cities Metropolitan Region of Families Affected by the *Hollman* Consent Decree



The families who were relocated upgraded their neighborhoods considerably according to census characteristics. Their new neighborhoods had higher median incomes, higher percentages of residents employed, fewer neighbors below the poverty level, and higher housing values. Residents also moved into neighborhoods with fewer non-White households.

Although these results seem to suggest that the desegregation objectives of the lawsuit were achieved, there are several caveats that must be considered. First, just more than half of the relocated residents moved into other neighborhoods that met the consent decree's definition of poverty or race concentration. In addition, the neighborhoods to which families relocated were becoming more poverty- and race-concentrated than the rest of the city or metropolitan region. Finally, for families who made subsequent moves (after their initial relocation), these moves tended to be into neighborhoods with higher levels of poverty and more non-White residents. For all of these reasons, there is an expectation that the degree of deconcentration and neighborhood improvement achieved through relocation is likely to diminish over time.

Special Mobility Program

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development provided 900 Section 8 certificates and vouchers to facilitate the deconcentration of public housing families through the *Hollman* decree. A portion of these Section 8 subsidies was used by families relocated from the north side site. The rest were used to create a special mobility program in which participants volunteered to use these subsidies to move to homes in nonconcentrated neighborhoods. The program was open to some of the named plaintiffs, residents of Minneapolis public housing in concentrated neighborhoods, and persons on the public housing waiting list.

During a six-year period from 1996 to 2002, only 285 families participated in the special mobility program, or just more than 6% of all eligible families. Of the 285 families that participated, only 80 (29%) had successfully leased a housing unit as of March 2002. Most of the leases occurred after December 2000. In fact, during all of 1998 and 1999, only three families successfully used the program. These figures represent an extremely low level of participation and success for the special mobility program.

Each year, hundreds of Section 8 subsidies made available by HUD for the program are returned to Washington unused.

The low level of participation in the program is likely due to three factors. First, from 1997 to 2001, the Twin Cities experienced an extremely tight rental housing market, with vacancies consistently below 2% during most of that period. This made the Section 8 subsidies very difficult to use as landlords had their pick of applicants and many may have preferred to avoid the regulatory restrictions of the Section 8 program. Second, the MPHA used a 1996 waiting list to identify potential program participants. As the months and years went by, this waiting list became more and more out of date and fewer of the mailings actually reached eligible families. When MPHA updated its list in 2001, participation rates increased. Finally, there simply may be a lack of interest among eligible families for such a mobility program in the Twin Cities. Potential participants may be satisfied with their current housing, or satisfied enough that they do not want to trade their current situation for the difficulties of moving and the uncertainty of life in neighborhoods unfamiliar to them.

Most of the special mobility program participants (73%) were African American and most participating households were single-parent households (81%). Although they represented fewer of the program participants, Southeast Asian families were more likely to successfully

lease a unit under the program than were members of other racial or ethnic groups.

Most special mobility program families who successfully leased a unit under the program stayed in the central cities (53% stayed in Minneapolis and 5% moved to St. Paul). As with the relocated families, there was a tendency for program families to move to the northern inner-ring suburbs (14% did so). Another 10% moved to inner-ring suburbs to the south and west, and 13% moved into developing suburbs. Figure 2 shows the spatial distribution of mobility program participants.


Those who were able to successfully move under the mobility program did end up moving to neighborhoods that looked significantly different than the ones they previously occupied. This is not a surprise because the program required that families move into "deconcentrated" neighborhoods. The median income of the new neighborhoods was almost double that of the old neighborhoods and the neighborhoods had half as many very low income families, one-third the number of poor families, and twice as many homeowners. The neighborhoods also had, on average, much smaller non-White populations than the old neighborhoods. Thus, as with the relocation phase of *Hollman*, the special mobility program seems to have achieved the objective of deconcentrating assisted families into more middle-class and White neighborhoods. As with the relocation findings, however, there is an



Photo by Edward G. Goetz

In all, 440 households were relocated from the Sumner Field, Olson, Glenwood, and Lyndale projects on the north side of Minneapolis. The vast majority of families who were forced to move were Southeast Asian or African American, and most of the families expressed a desire to remain in Minneapolis.

Figure 2. Post-Move Addresses of Hollman Special Mobility Program Participants



important caveat. Although the mobility program worked when families were successfully able to move, there was very little demand for the program in the first place (6% of eligible families) and there was a low rate of success among those who did participate (29%).

Replacement Housing

The consent decree called for the replacement of all public housing units lost to demolition or conversion during the redevelopment of the north side site, which was 770 units. The replacement units were to be developed only in nonconcentrated neighborhoods in the Twin Cities metropolitan region. Two hundred of the public housing replacement units will eventually go back on the north side site. The consent decree mandates that at least 80 more be placed in nonconcentrated neighborhoods in Minneapolis and that at least 380 be located in suburban areas in the region.

Similar to the special mobility program, the effort to build replacement housing got off to a slow start. The reasons for this were both technical and political. Technically, the MPHA had no direct authority to develop public housing outside the city of Minneapolis. It was constrained from the beginning by the need to identify partnership agencies that would work together to make the suburban public housing units happen. In addition, some of the more arcane rules and regulations related to building public housing presented obstacles, as did the lack of an interested public agency in many suburbs. Finally, there was not enough money set aside in the consent decree to build all of the 770 units called for. Higher acquisition costs in the suburbs meant that more money was necessary to build the units. In the end, all of these difficulties were overcome; three suburban housing agencies (the Housing and Redevelopment Authorities of Carver, Scott, and Wash-


ington Counties) agreed to develop Hollman units, the Metropolitan Council came forward after some time to develop units in suburban areas not covered by other agencies, and HUD agreed to allow a portion of the unused special mobility program budget authority to be shifted into the replacement housing effort. In addition, MPHA entered into agreements with private and nonprofit developers to include some *Hollman* units in other projects being developed.

Political obstacles to building public housing in suburban areas (and in nonconcentrated parts of the city) are not new and they were not significantly different in the *Hollman* case than they have been for decades in communities across the United States. Neighbors worried about crime, property values, the influx of lower income families, and various disruptions of community life. However, even these objections were overcome in enough places so that by the end of 2001, MPHA had commitments in place for all of the 770 units of replacement housing. The units are a mix of newly developed apartments and townhomes, and scattered-site units purchased by public agencies and rented out as public housing (typically single-family, duplex, and townhome units).

Figure 3 shows the location of units completed or under construction as of February 2002. A total of 332 units were ready for occupancy in early 2002, 80 in Minneapolis and 252 in the suburbs. The suburban communities of Woodbury and Shakopee lead the way with 34 and 27 *Hollman* replacement units, respectively. Figure 3 shows a broad scattering of units throughout the region, with significant numbers in the southwestern portion of the region. There are no units in Dakota County because Dakota County Board of Commissioners refused to participate in the program.

The neighborhoods in which the replacement housing is located are predominantly White (94%), with a median household income of more than \$40,000, very small populations of people in poverty and low-income residents, and high percentages of homeowners and employed residents. On all of these dimensions, the replacement neighborhoods differ from the old north side site. Yet again, there is evidence that the objectives of the consent decree have been at least partially met. At the same time, however, only 57% of the replacement units in the suburbs are occupied by families who have moved out of

Figure 3. Geographic Distribution of *Hollman* Units Completed or Under Construction, February 2002



Minneapolis. The consent decree allows suburban housing agencies to reserve up to 30% of the replacement units for families from the suburban waiting lists, but in practice, a larger percentage of these units are going to suburbanites. This is occurring for two reasons. First, some agencies have reported difficulties reaching Minneapolis families because of the outdated waiting lists provided to them by MPHA. This is a problem that was addressed when MPHA updated its list in 2001. Second, many of these units simply are not attractive to Minneapolis families who are unfamiliar with the far reaches of Carver, Scott, and Washington Counties; may not have access to an automobile; or may not want to live in those communities.

The Experiences of *Hollman* Families

The CURA research team conducted in-person interviews with 618 families to examine how *Hollman* families are doing in their new communities. The survey included five categories of families: (1) families displaced from the north side site (a total of 195 respondents), (2) families that used the *Hollman* Special Mobility Program to move to nonconcentrated neighborhoods (a total of 18 respondents), (3) families living in the replacement housing built throughout the region (32 respondents), (4) a comparison group of Minneapolis Section 8 program participants (200 respondents), and (5) a comparison group of Minneapolis public housing residents living in

concentrated neighborhoods (173 respondents).

The sample of special mobility program and replacement housing families is small because at the time the interviews were conducted (1999), there were very few families in these categories. In conducting the analysis, the mobility program and replacement housing respondents were combined into a single group called “voluntary” *Hollman* participants. This distinguishes them from the group of families involuntarily displaced from the north side site who did not have a choice to participate because their units were torn down and they were forced to move. The voluntary and displaced groups are contrasted with the Section 8 and public housing comparison groups, which include families with similar demographic characteristics but who did not participate in the *Hollman* decree in any way.

Survey participants were asked a series of questions about the degree to which they interact with their neighbors, their satisfaction with various neighborhood and housing conditions, levels of crime and public disorder in their neighborhoods, employment, and their children’s experiences. *Hollman* families were asked to answer these questions about their new neighborhoods as well as their old neighborhoods. The program is considered to have had a positive effect if *Hollman* families reported better conditions at their current address than the comparison groups or better conditions in their current housing than at their previous address.

Children’s Experiences. Respondents were asked about their children’s experiences in school and in their new neighborhoods. There were no program effects related to children’s school experiences. *Hollman* families (both voluntary and displaced) were no more likely to say that their children like school, do well in school, or receive enough attention from teachers than were the comparison group respondents.

Voluntary participants in the *Hollman* programs were more likely than others to report that their children had friends in the neighborhood and played with others in the neighborhood. Displaced families reported significantly lower rates of social interaction among their children. In fact, among the displaced families, there was a significant decline in the social interaction of their children in their new neighborhoods compared to the old one. Southeast Asian families also



Despite political and technical obstacles to building public housing in suburban areas of the Twin Cities, by the end of 2001, MPHA had commitments for all 770 units of replacement housing required by the consent decree. The replacement units are a mix of newly developed apartments and townhomes, and scattered-site units purchased by public agencies and rented out as public housing.

tended to report lower levels of social interaction among their children in their new neighborhoods.

“Neighboring” Behaviors. Respondents were asked about the frequency of their interactions with neighbors. On all items tested—including how often they say hello to neighbors, how often they talk with neighbors, or how frequently they borrow things—there were no signs of a program effect. That is, *Hollman* families did not do these things any more or less frequently than the comparison group members, nor did they do them any more or less frequently than they used to before they moved. As with the previous finding, there was a tendency among Southeast Asian respondents to report fewer neighboring behaviors than did members of other groups.

Whether a lack of change in neighboring behaviors is a positive or a negative result can be debated. Some defend *Hollman*-like deconcentration by suggesting that lower income public housing families can benefit from the greater levels of social capital that exist in middle-income neighborhoods. This is unlikely to be the case, however, if they are not interacting with those neighbors. On the other hand, some argue that the greatest benefits of deconcentration are in getting poor families out of the most dysfunctional and dangerous neighborhoods in the

city. In this case, the benefits of the program do not hinge on the families interacting with their new neighbors.

Neighborhood Satisfaction. Respondents were asked about the degree to which they were satisfied with eight separate neighborhood characteristics: bus service, schools, proximity to place of worship, proximity to friends, proximity to healthcare, childcare in the neighborhood, grocery stores, and parks and playgrounds. When controlling for demographic differences across the groups, the *Hollman* families reported higher satisfaction than the comparison groups only for grocery stores and parks. The voluntary group actually reported less satisfaction than the comparison groups with bus service in the neighborhood. The voluntary group also registered less satisfaction with bus service and with proximity to place of worship than did the displaced respondents. Taken together, these findings indicate that neighborhood satisfaction is not a monolithic concept. Program participants saw an improvement in some aspects of their neighborhoods, but expressed less satisfaction with other elements. For the majority of neighborhood characteristics, however, there was simply no program effect at all.

Neighborhood Problems. Respondents were asked about the existence of neighborhood problems such as graffiti, public drinking, drug use, and aban-

doned buildings. Both displaced and voluntary *Hollman* families reported fewer of these problems in their communities than did the comparison groups, and both the displaced and voluntary groups reported a significant decline in the prevalence of these problems from their old neighborhoods to their new neighborhoods. For example, 13% of the displaced respondents and 18% of the voluntary respondents reported drug use in their current neighborhoods was a moderate or major problem. This is compared with 47% of the Section 8 respondents and 33% of the public housing respondents. In addition, the percentage of displaced and voluntary respondents who felt that drug use was a problem in their old neighborhood was 44% and 51%, respectively. Thus, both groups reported that their new neighborhoods have significantly fewer problems with drug use than their old neighborhoods.

Crime and Safety. As with neighborhood problems, crime and safety are issues for which program effects are evident. Both the displaced and the voluntary group reported feeling safer in their new communities than did the comparison groups. They also reported that their children felt safer in the neighborhood and in their schools than did the comparison group respondents. The improvement in safety is somewhat less pronounced among the displaced families, however. The displaced families reported feeling safer in their neighborhoods, but reported no change pre- to postmove for their children, either in school or in the neighborhood.

Employment. Moving to new neighborhoods did not impact the employment of *Hollman* families in any of the ways we examined. Rates of employment were no different after the move than they were before the move and those who were employed reported no differences in wage rates, opportunities for advancement, or the number of hours worked.

Conclusion

In terms of the implementation, the *Hollman* consent decree must be called a success. The co-defendants in the lawsuit have done what they promised, even in the face of technical and political obstacles. Families have been relocated, north side redevelopment has begun, the special mobility program is up and running, and most impressively, all of the required replacement housing has been developed or approved.

In terms of impact, however, the story is more complicated. Families have moved to new neighborhoods that show significantly fewer signs of distress and poverty than their previous neighborhoods. But, for relocatees, half moved directly to other neighborhoods that met the decree's threshold for poverty or race concentration and most have moved to neighborhoods that are becoming more concentrated over time. Even the subsequent moves of these families, when they have occurred, have been to neighborhoods with higher distress indicators. For these reasons, the reasonable expectation is that these families will eventually become more concentrated in distressed neighborhoods. The special mobility program succeeded in moving families to neighborhoods that appear significantly better than the families' previous communities with respect to the measures we examined. Yet, the scope of the mobility program was greatly limited by a lack of demand for the mobility certificates and by the difficulty in using Section 8 subsidies in the tight housing market that gripped the Twin Cities between 1997 and 2000. Even the greatest achievement of the *Hollman* effort—the development of public housing in suburban areas—has not led

to the desired level of desegregation because many of the units are not occupied by Minneapolis families.

The impact of the housing moves made by *Hollman* families has been less than what has been experienced in other cities. Studies of the Gautreaux program in Chicago and the national Moving to Opportunity demonstration program have shown dramatic improvements in the conditions of participants. The *Hollman* families do not report as many dramatic changes. *Hollman* families do report significant benefits from reductions in visible neighborhood problems and feelings of greater safety. However, on most items their experiences do not differ significantly from other Section 8 families or families living in other public housing in concentrated neighborhoods.

There are two likely explanations for the modest level of benefits reported by *Hollman* families. First, unlike the *Gautreaux* case or similar cases in other cities across the country, a large portion of the *Hollman* families are recent immigrants from Southeast Asia. These respondents reported greater reluctance to participate in the program and fewer benefits than did other respondents. These families likely valued the spatial concentration they experienced on the

north side because it allowed them to maintain family and social ties important to immigrants. Second, it is the case that even the worst public housing in Minneapolis is not as bad as what exists in Chicago and other cities that implemented the Moving to Opportunity program. Moving from the worst public housing in Minneapolis to another neighborhood does not constitute the same degree of change that moving from the worst public housing in Chicago entails. More modest benefits, in this scenario, are simply reflective of more modest changes in the objective conditions experienced by families participating in the program.

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HACER Receives Community Collaborator of the Year Award

Hispanic Advocacy and Community Empowerment through Research (HACER) was recognized as a catalyst for community change when it was named the 2002 Community Collaborator of the Year by Chicanos Latinos Unidos En Servicio (CLUES) at a September 20 dinner at Metropolitan State University in St. Paul.

A nonprofit community-based research and advocacy organization, HACER is dedicated to providing the Latino/Latina community of Minnesota the ability to create and control information about itself in order to affect institutional decisions and public policy. The organization receives administrative support from and has its offices at CURA.

Executive director Claudia Fuentes said HACER's staff and board members were honored to receive the award.

"In the past year we released five reports, all of which were collaborative efforts with organizations statewide," she noted. "The support we receive from CURA enables HACER to work in partnership with Latinos in Minnesota while simultaneously involving University of Minnesota professors and students in our research efforts."

Maureen Acosta, director of fund development at CLUES, said her organization was "delighted to present the award to HACER, given their tremendous work in researching and producing reports on [the

Latino/Latina] community. These reports are helping to shape policy and the direction that the community is going."

The Community Collaborator of the Year award was created in 2001 to recognize organizations that work with other agencies and the broader Minnesota community for the betterment of Latinos/Latinas in the state. Last year's recipients included the Latino Complete Count Committee and co-recipients West Side Community Health Services and La Oportunidad.